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Federal district judges are stuck in a bad marriage with the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines after Booker v. Unittd States.'
While most of the sentencing debate centers around the
struggle over judicial discretion and power to control sentencing outcomes, 2 little attention is given to how poorly we
inform the sentencing court's discretion. The information
provided to the court at sentencing is lacking and outdated.
The Booker Court freed district judges from the "mandatory
guideline era" (rg88-2oo5), 3 but also required that district
judges continue to calculate, "consult," and explain variances from the applicable guideline range.4 A sentencing
court needs better, competing information to rival the distracting and often misleading Guidelines. 5
In white-collar cases, the Guidelines' numbers and calculations often distort the true story of an individual and his
or her offense conduct. The guideline provisions related to
loss, 6 victims, and the defendant's role in the offense7 long
have drawn criticism. Senior District Judge Jed S. Rakoff.
when speaking about the Guidelines in a March 2013 keynote address, criticized the Guidelines and their effect on
district judges' sentencing determinations.8 Judge Rakoff,
like some other judges, favors a multifactor, nonmathematic test.9 In fact, Judge Rakoff offered his "modest proposal" that the Guidelines be "scrapped in their entirety.'' 10
I questioned aspects of that approach and argued that we
invite more problems than we solve by offering less information and guidance to judges at sentencing. 11 This article
is a call for more information to be made available to judges
at sentencing.
The unjustified numbers and calculations in the
Guidelines dominate the analysis and distract the court at
sentencing.u The Sentencing Commission has never
articulated on what basis it assigns a 2-level enhancement
to another Sso,ooo in loss, the next 40 victims of
a scheme, or for that matter, an additional 20 grams of
heroin. Judge Rakoff rightly called the numbers in the
Guidelines "unjustified" and "artificially infiated.''' 3 Yet,
no information dictates the ultimate sentence imposed
more than the numbers in the Guidelines. Information
provided to the court about the individual qualities of the
defendant and specific circumstances of the crime typically modify, and take a back seat to, the unsupported
mathematics of the Guidelines.' 4 If the numbers and
calculations in the Guidelines continue as the best

information we provide to the court,' 5 then the sentencing
goals of consistency and proportionality will be aspirational only, but not real.
The federal criminal justice system focuses more on who
has the power to sentence than on why a specific sentence is
fair in this case for this defendant. This article first argues
that the focus on, and power struggle over, judicial discretion is misplaced. Neither granting judges increased discretion, nor Congress' next piece of sentencing legislation
designed to restrict judicial discretion, improves the pro·
cess, or outcomes, of federal sentencing.
Next, the Supreme Court mangled the process of federal
sentencing. This article posits that if the judges are procedurally wed to the Guidelines, then we must improve the
process in two ways. First, the Commission should phase
out the numbers and calculations in the Guidelines, yet
preserve the Guidelines' framework as the multifactor test
for the Probation Office to describe in a Presentence
Report. ' 6 Second, Probation should furnish the court with
better, competing information to rival the Guidelines'
numbers and calculations.'7 Federal sentencing can achieve
uniformity and proportionality by providing more meaningful, less unjustified information to district judges.
Lastly, this article offers three broad classifications of
material to better inform a district judge's discretion at
sentencing: (r) "big data" designed to truly promote consistency and proportionality after Booker; (2) a searchable,
comparable case database; and (3) contractual agreements
or recommendations from the parties.
I. Struggling over Judicial Discretion, Instead of
Informing It

The Booker Court restored sentencing discretion to federal
district judges. The Court, however, saddled the district
judge's process with the distracting and often misleading
numbers and calculations supplied by the Guidelines. The
numbers in the Guidelines are as arbitrary and unjustified
after Booker as they were when mandatory. The Court,
however, required that the sentencing court must calculate
and consult the applicable guideline range for an offensein perpetuity. The process itself negatively affects judicial
discretion.
The "calculate and consult procedure" of post-Booker
federal sentencing appears to align with the sentencing
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goals of uniformity and proportionality.18 In the initial years
immediately following Booker, a district judge may have
benefited from consulting how a similarly situated defendant was sentenced from the mandatory guideline era.
Today, eight years later, forcing a district judge to consider
numbers and calculations from a twenty-year stretch in
history has, and will continue to, become increasingly less
helpful. By comparison, consider how infrequently, if ever,
a judge imposing a sentence during the mandato:r;y guideline era referenced pre-Guidelines sentencing decisions to
inform her decision. Interestingly, however, the bad marriage to the Guidelines and the need for better information
at sentencing has not been the discussion in federal
sentencing.
A. The Struggle to Control Sentencing Outcomes

)

Much of the debate in federal sentencing over the last forty
years resembles a·tug-of.war over judicial discretion. Congress and the Sentencing Commission through its mandatory guidelines dictated sentencing outcomes in federal
courts for nearly twenty years. Then the Supreme Court in
Booker tugged the rope back over to favor judicial discretion.
Congress now seeks to legislate new ways to tie the court's
hands at sentencing.' 9 As imposed federal sentences continue to slide downward away from the once "applicable"
guideline range, legislators inevitably will consider stepping in to reassert control. One of the few consistencies
related to sentencing outcomes has been the power struggle
to control them.
When either side-either Congress and the Commission
or the judiciary-gains an advantage in the struggle over
sentencing power, other problems in the criminal justice
system arise. On the one hand, Congress and the Commission fight to standardize sentencing results and curb
judicial discretion. Yet, when we curb a district judge's
discretion at sentencing with mandatory minimum sentences and prejudicial sentencing enhancements, the process reeks of rigidity and cannot properly incorporate
individual and case-specific circumstances. No party in the
federal criminal justice system~ven prosecutors-wants
to return to the inflexibility of the mandatory guideline
era.~ 0

On the other hand, district judges clamored for more
discretion to tailor their decisions to individual circumstances and defendants. Yet, left unbounded, federal sentencing cannot achieve its goals of consistency and
proportionality. District judges ascend from a spectrum of
professional and personal experiences. For example, a significant percentage of district judges, who practiced and
presided over criminal matters during the mandatory
guideline era, may adhere more closely to Guideline sentences. The blind adherence could be habit, 21 but it could
also indicate a judge's misplaced notions of consistency or
a lack of information to better exercise her discretion. ~z
Further, the workings of the federal criminal justice system
break down when sentencing lacks predictability for the
individual defendant. 2 3

B. Neither More Judicial Discretion nor More Binding
Legislation Assists the Process of Sentencing

Neither the judiciary's renewed discretion nor the prospect
of more legislatively mandated sentences improves the
process of sentencing. The sentencing judge merely reads
a report about the crime and the individual defendant
before imposing i!life-altering sentence. Legislators know
even less about individual defendants when they propose
legislation aimed at guaranteed sentencing outcomes.
The parties to a federal criminal case who know the
most about the offense conduct and the offender-the
defendant and prosecutor-inexplicably have the least
input into the sentence imposed. ~4 Of the federal criminal
cases charged, 90 percent or more end in guilty pleas. ~s
The procedural rule governing pleas provides for a recommendation from, or binding agreements of, the parties. 26
Yet, these provisions are severely underutilized. Joint party
recommendations and binding agreements under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure n(c)(r) remain the rare exception, not the rule. Why? Because many district judges disfavor input from the parties, believing that binding
agreements either invade their judicial discretion or reduce
their role at sentencing to a rubber stamp. 2 7
In the struggle over power to control sentencing, the
process and the quality of the information provided to the
court at sentencing have suffered. The information available to the district judge at sentencing is weak and outdated.
Then it is organized under the Guidelines' distorted and
unhelpful numbers and calculations, which dominate the
court's attention. Technological advances and informational advancement have passed by, while the static, outdated report sent to chambers before sentencing remains
largely unchanged. Elsewhere in industry~ven elsewhere
in government-information is high-speed, on-demand,
and optimized to the user's needs. When it comes to sentencing in federal court, judges might as well be carrying
around a typewriter and white-out.
C. Current Information in a Presentence Report

To promote the sentencing goals of consistency and proportionality, the federal judiciary receives a thick Presentence Report (PSR) prepared by the U.S. Probation Office.
PSRs contain a lot of information-far more information
than may be provided to state, military, or other criminal
judges imposing sentence. A typical PSR includes social
work-type details about the individual defendant. It
includes the case-related details which, especially in the
more than 90 percent of cases resolved by guilty plea, are
no more than recycled, factual summaries from investigative reports.28 The only new information in PSRs comes
from victim impact statements and letters from supporters.
In a white-collar case, for example, the numerous paragraphs in a PSR broadly describe the defendant's role in the
fraud scheme within a larger organization, the theory of
loss, and the number of victims, from the perspective of the
investigators. Then these paragraphs are modified by, and
reduced to, a number-again, an unjustified, arbitrary
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number. For example, a +14 sentencing enhancement is
applied for a loss amount of $866,ooo. When the judge
reads the description, she cannot help but be instantly
affected by the numerical modifier. Much like today's
online reviews of products and services that reduce
unending streams of information to "4-stars," "8o percent
satisfied," and "thumbs down" ratings, the rating dwarfs
the reasoning. The reader naturally reacts to the classification and the easily digestible number assigned more so
than the underlying descriptions.
Congress empowered the Sentencing Commission to
create the Sentencing Guidelines and report sentencing
data back to Congress. 2 9 It also told Probation Offices to
include calculations based on the applicable guidelines as
part of the PSR. The Guidelines represent the most
impactful math word problem anywhere in criminal law.
However, these numbers and calculations, despite their
importance, still lack justification.l 0
The Guidelines have always valued formulas, even
unjustified formulas, over individuals and individual circumstances-and nothing has changed in the decade of
post-Booker analysis. Section 2Br.1, the fraud guideline,l'
possibly ranks as the most stark example. It treats individual sentencing outcomes like the estimated monthly payment spit-out of a mortgage calculator. The single
overpowering factor of loss amount32 and the stubborn
adherence to "relevant conduct" weigh heavily against
white-collar offenders. With the Guidelines, white-collar
offenders evolved from the traditionally under-sentenced to
the most consistently over-sentenced sector of federal
defendants. The federal judiciary must improve the process
of sentencing, and to do so, it needs other data and nonmathematical information so the Guidelines do not continue to have an overshadowing effect on sentencing
determinations.
II. The Two Solutions

We can solve the procedural drawbacks of federal sentencing caused by the Booker court in two ways. The first way,
while politically unlikely, is to retain the narrative section of
the PSR that corresponds to the Guidelines provisions yet
phase out the accompanying numbers and calculations. The
second way, discussed in greater detail in Section III below,
is to provide new, competing information to district judges
at sentencing to rival the numbers and calculations of the
Guidelines.
A. Phase Out the Numbers and Calculations of the
Guidelines

The federal government should phase out the numbers and
calculations in the Guidelines. As opposed to scrapping
them completely, the federal government should convert
the Guidelines into factors that the court must consider.
District judges could consult the Guidelines as specific
factors to consider in individual cases. The numbers and
calculations, however, have no sustainable utility. Modern
district judges do not consider available sentencing data
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from the decades of sentences preceding the Guidelines,
because most imposed sentences from the past eras are not
helpful to judges imposing a sentence tomorrow.
Judge Rakoffhypothesized that with multifactored,
nonnumeric guidance alone, judges would better justify
their sentences. 33 I offer some words of caution for that
idea. First, requiring judges to consider broad sentencing
principles was unsuccessful before the Guidelines. 34 Second, the Supreme Court already mandated that federal
district judges not only calculate and consult the Guidelines
but also consider the long-forgotten sentencing maxims in
Title 18, United States Code, § 3553(a). 35 This "factors to be
considered when imposing sentence" statute includes
non-numeric guidance, such as "the need for the sentence
imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense." 36 Judges, for the most part, parrot
the language of the non-numeric guidance and merely
touch the bases to pass appellate review. The federal criminal justice system should maintain the structure, organization, and considerations of the Guidelines, but do away
with the distracting and misleading numbers and calculations that accompany the Guidelines. Redacting the numbers and calculations from the Guidelines would provide
a middle ground between our current system and Judge
Rakoffs proposal. It also would ensure more robust judicial
reasoning for an imposed sentence by the district judge.
For example, in a fraud case, Probation would continue
to describe the scheme to defraud under the familiar headings, but without the numbers and calculations. The court
would pay greater attention to the actual offense conduct
organized under the Guidelines' headings, including the
dollar amount of the loss, basis of the calculation, number
of victims, and the defendant's role in the scheme. District
judges have imposed sentences pulling further away from
the Guidelines each year since 2005, when the Court
decided Booker.37 The numbers and calculations of the
Guidelines will carry less and less weight for a sentencing
judge as more time passes. Phase out the numbers and
calculations now before they represent a functionally irrelevant "anchoring point" for judges at sentencing.l 8
Further, the numbers and calculations of the Guidelines
have severely cluttered the appellate courts' true, independent ability to review sentences for reasonableness. A circuit court's substantive "reasonableness" review on appeal
has repeatedly turned on the reasonableness of the applicable guideline as much as whether the court's imposed
sentence was reasonable. 39 If we phase out the numbers
and calculations within the Guidelines, then the appellate
courts' review and the "reasonableness" standard also will
become more robust and meaningful.
B. Provide New, Competing Information

The second solution is to provide district judges with different, competing information to the unhelpful, misleading
guidelines. This solution is feasible with a reallocation of
resources and attention. Particularly with today's
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technological advances and the availability oflimitless data,
district judges armed with renewed discretion need more
and better quality information at sentencing. As set forth
below, district judges could be better informed and the
goals of sentencing better served with (1) sentencing data
reports, (2) searchable, comparable-case databases, and (3)
party recommendations and agreements. This information
should become part of PSRs and be made available to the
sentencing court in addition to the numbers and calculation
of the Guidelines. Over time, district courts will pay equal
or greater attention to other information at sentencing, like
the types discussed below, as compared to the numbers and
calculations of Guidelines.
Ill. Proposed New Information at Sentencing

The conversation must progress beyond the tussle over
judicial discretion to the resources we devote to informing
the court's discretion at sentencing.

data, then we should organize and analyze it in a way
helpful to the district court during sentencing. For example,
the PSR could include regional sentencing and district
statistics in different categories of cases and specific offense
conduct characteristics since 2005, state statistics of comparable offense conduct, 47 or variance percentages organized according to specific guidelines' provisions or factual
commonalities. For example, in a fraud case, a sentencing
judge could focus on data related to sentences that applied
a particular enhancement or involved a threshold level of
loss or victims.
This does not happen currently, but it could soon. If this
data is available already and used so widely elsewhere in
business and society, then the federal government should
use the information to assist in one of our most important
societal determinations, the sentencing of criminal
defendants.
B. Comparative Cases, Keywords, and

A. "Big Data" of Post-Booker Sentencing Statistics

"Big data" is a twenty-first-century term of art that refers to
the "tools, processes and procedures allowing an organization to create, manipulate, and manage very large data
sets and storage facilities." 40 Many traditional models have
been ushered into retirement because of our capability to
gather and interpret vast amounts of data. Today, we gather
big data on everything and then adapt the way we slice and
evaluate the data to our needs. The post-Booker sentencing
data, properly gather~d and analyzed, could inform district
judges' discretion with real-world, meaningful numbers.
Businesses enhance profits, curb expenses, improve
marketing efforts, and optimize customer interaction by
processing and interpreting large volumes of data. Even our
leisure plans,4' personal fitness ,42 talent predictors in
sports,4 3 and traditional educational systems 44 have been
forever disrupted4 5 by those who gather and interpret the
available data. Unlike the Guidelines' arbitrary numbers
assigned to certain conduct or circumstances, big data
allows human behavior to produce empirically justified
numbers. Efficient, smart, and successful organizations
don't assign arbitrarily created numbers to conduct;
instead, they gather and interpret actual data derived from
behavior.
In the context of federal sentencing, the Probation
Office or some other entity could slice useful data for the
court.46 A court, for instance, could receive data about the
percentage of district judges who applied a downward variance, and to what degree, in fraud cases with a loss of more
than $mo million. The Commission collects and reports to
Congress about some federal sentencing data. For the postBooker sentencing data that details district judges' behavior
and results, the Commission reports its statistics under
general crime labels, months of confinement averages, and
downward departures and variances, with and without .
a government or defense motion. Although the Commission's Booker Reports are publically available, this data is
not even part of the PS R in a specific case. If we gather the

User-Optimized Results

Next, the Probation Office could provide or make available
more user-optimized information to district judges before
sentencing. The PSR, a static report developed from other
reports, is outdated and lacking functionality. Competitive
industry long ago would have organized and made searchable a comparable case analysis from hundreds of similar
decisions made each day through the country. Instead,
a district judge considers only her own prior cases or, at
best, the other judges in the building. More comparable
cases could inform the court's discretion at sentencing.
In the age of optimized search results, the judiciary
should devote resources to a database capable of geographic, judge-specific, and other "search term" limitations
to isolate similar cases. After Booker, the district court ideally should better explain the reasoning underlying its
imposed sentences. District judges should benefit from the
reasoning offered by their colleagues-and not just the
judge down the hall. Each imposed sentence, set of findings, judgment, and sentencing hearing transcript provides
numerical information outside of the Guidelines' numbers,
coupled with analysis and reasoning. Imagine if one federal
court could access a database that captured all post-Booker
sentences, logically coded with tags and search terms to
facilitate a user-optimized search.
The database, even if not searched by the sentencing
judge in a given case, could produce a digest of comparable
cases, complete with a summary of the underlying judicial
reasoning and charts of the imposed sentences. Conceivably, the database could be closed and available only internally to the network of district judges, and thus, judges
could offer additional (internal use only) notes and tags to
assist the next judge handing down a sentence to a similarly
situated defendant. In a white-collar case, for example, the
defendant's applicable guideline may call for 120-132
months' imprisonment based upon the amount ofloss and
niunber of victims. The comparable case database, however, may reveal that in fraud cases with the same loss and
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number of victims around the country, judges sentenced on
average only 65 months' imprisonment and only 14 percent
of courts imposed a Guideline sentence, followed by the
reasoning of several federal judges. The numbers and rea·
soning could truly inform the next judge's discretion.
C. Recommendations or Contractual Agreements of
the Parties

Prosecutors, working with the defense, are better positioned to resolve cases and justify fair and reasonable sen·
tences than federal district judges. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure n(c)(r) permits prosecutors and counsel for
criminal defendants to jointly recommend48 or contract for
a binding or "agreed-upon" sentence. 49 As compared to
district judges, the prosecution and defense are in the best
position to articulate their justification for a recommendation or an agreed-upon sentence in a written plea agreement and in open court. Yet, the parties rarely use Rule
n(c)(r) and, therefore, seldom provide their joint recommendation to district judges.
District judges cannot participate in plea discussion~.
But the parties may and should negotiate a specific,
numerical outcome and communicate it to the court. By
comparison, the joint recommendation of the parties controls sentencing in the military justice system. In state
court, the parties routinely negotiate and jointly propose
sentencing recommendations to the court. Somewhere
along the way, the unwritten (and judge-by-judge) rule in
most federal courts discouraged federal criminal litigants
from doing the same, despite the clear intent of the legislators in Rule n(c)(r).
Most federal sentencing hearings proceed without any
joint recommendation or specific agreement from the
parties. Many district judges, because of their long struggle
for discretion, simply disfavor agreed-upon sentences from
the parties. Because defense attorneys would support more
joint recommendations and agreements that, by their very
nature, fall below the applicable Guideline range, it is the
judiciary and the U.S. Department of Justice that stand in
the way of the procedural change. DOJ could change this
policy immediately with an_Attomey General directive to all
prosecutors. The federal judiciary similarly could invite
recommendations and agreements in the district "local
rules" or local practice.
A district judge should find this information from the
parties more meaningful than the distracting and misleading Guidelines. Ironically, the Supreme Court intended
the advisory Guidelines to promote judicial discretion to
ensure uniform, proportional, and fair punishment. To do
so, the district court gives great weight to arbitrary numbers
and calculations assigned by a legislatively created agency
without regard for individual defendants facing sentencing.
The court, at the same time, discourages or wholly rejects
agreed-upon input from the government who brought the
case to court and the individual facing sentencing.
Although joint recommendations and binding plea agree·
ments do suffer from some limitations, these tools are far
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more reliable than the Guideline numbers that currently
dominate the sentencing court's attention.

IV. Conclusion
If the goal is better judicial reasoning for federal sentences,
then do not force judges to calculate and consider distract·
ing and misleading numbers in the Guidelines. We must
provide better, competing information-more numeric
data, other than the numbers in the Guidelines, as well as
searchable, non-numeric description to the courts. With
a smart and pointed reallocation of resources, the federal
criminal justice system could move away from the arbitrary
and unhelpful information provided to judges at sentencing
toward useful and meaningful information.
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instead from unchecked judicial discretion in formulating
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mission. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2010).
Christine DeMaso, Advisory Sentencing and the Federalization
of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the
Disparity Between State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?,
106 CoLUM. L. REv . 2095, 2099 (2006).
Fed . R. Crim. P. ll(c)(1XB).
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